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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises in the wake of the settlement of a 
nationwide class action against The Prudential Insurance 
Company of America. Two policyholders who were members 
of the class appeal the district court's order enjoining them 
from prosecuting suits they filed in state court in Florida 
based upon policies that were eligible for inclusion in the 
nationwide class, but which the plaintiffs excluded from the 
terms of the class settlement. For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm. 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
 
A large group of policy holders started a nationwide class 
action against Prudential Life Insurance Company alleging 
that Prudential agents had engaged in deceptive sales 
practices. 
 
       The class is comprised of [over 8 million] Prudential 
       policyholders who allegedly were the victims of 
       fraudulent and misleading sales practices employed by 
       Prudential's sales force. The challenged sales practices 
       consisted primarily of churning,2 vanishing premiums3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The facts surrounding the litigation and settlement can be found in 
the district court's opinion approving the settlement as well as our prior 
opinion affirming the district court. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America Sales Practices Litigation, 962 F. Supp. 450 (E. D. Pa. 1997), 
aff 'd 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom, Johnson v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999); and Krell v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). Accordingly, we will 
only set forth the background of the underlying class action here to the 
extent that it places our inquiry in context and assists our discussion. 
 
2. The district court explained that "[i]n the life insurance context, the 
term `churning' refers to the removal, through misrepresentations or 
omissions, of the cash value, including dividends, of an existing life 
insurance policy or annuity to acquire a replacement policy. The value of 
the first policy may be reduced either by borrowing against the policy or 
by virtue of the policy's lapse. Churning often results in financial 
detriment to the policyholder, a financial benefit to the agent by virtue 
of a large commission on the first year premium, and administrative 
charges being paid to the insurer." In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
Sales Practices Litigation, 962 F. Supp. 450, 474. (E. D. Pa. 1997) 
" `Churning' in the life insurance context is also referred to as 
`twisting' 
or `piggybacking.' " Id. at 474 n.11. "A replacement policy is a policy 
financed through using equity, cash value, dividends, interest, or 
premiums from an existing policy." Id. at 474 n.12. A replacement policy 
is "rarely in the best interests of the policy holder because: (1) 
existing 
policy premiums are usually lower because a replacement takes place 
when the insured is in a less favorable underwriting class; (2) 
acquisition 
costs are charged in the early years of a policy and the policyholder 
incurs these costs again with the replacement policy; and (3) 
replacement renews the risk that an incontestability or suicide clause 
will be incorporated into a policy." Id. at 475. 
 
3. The district court found that "Prudential agents used `Abbreviated 
Payment Plan' (`APP'), or `vanishing premium' policies, often in 
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       and fraudulent investment plans,4 and each cause of 
       action is based on fraud or deceptive conduct. 
 
148 F.3d at 289. 
 
On October 28, 1996, the class representatives entered 
into a Stipulation of Settlement with Prudential. App. at 
668-724. That same day, the district court entered an 
Order Conditionally Certifying the Class for Settlement 
Purposes, Designating Class Counsel and Class 
Representatives, Staying Pending Motions, Directing 
Issuance of Notice, Issuing Injunction and Scheduling 
Settlement Hearing (the "Certification Order"). App. at 725- 
38. In that Certification Order, the district court also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
conjunction with churning, to sell permanent life insurance policies to 
class members; Prudential agents misrepresented that policyholders 
would have to pay no out-of-pocket premiums after a certain number of 
premium payments during the initial years of the policies. . . . 
Prudential's standardized sales presentations and policy illustrations 
failed to disclose that the policy premiums would not vanish and that 
Prudential did not expect the policies to pay for themselves as 
illustrated. Prudential's illustrations also did not inform policyholders 
of 
the assumptions on which the policy illustrations were based, 
assumptions which had no reasonable basis in fact. .. . Agents 
frequently merged churning tactics and APP policies, forcing 
policyholders to pay the premium cost of the APP policy by dissipating 
the cash value of an existing life insurance policy." 962 F. Supp. at 476. 
 
4. The district court explained that "Prudential fraudulently marketed 
life 
insurance policies as `investment plans,' `retirement plans,' or similar 
investment vehicles. Plaintiffs allege that Prudential agents failed to 
disclose that these purported `investment plans' were really standard life 
insurance policies, which carried costs and other components that 
materially and adversely differed from true investment or retirement 
plans. . . . Specifically, Prudential misrepresented to policyholders, 
through standard presentations and materials, that life insurance 
policies were equivalent to investment or savings accounts, pension 
maximization or retirement plans, college-tuition funding plans, mutual 
funds, or other investment or savings plans. . . . As with the APP plans, 
Prudential agents often used the investment plan scheme in conjunction 
with churning to persuade existing policyholders to replace their policies 
with `new' ones, misrepresenting the benefits that policyholders could 
achieve by transferring the accumulated cash values to the `investment 
plan.' " 926 F. Supp. at 476-77. 
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conditionally certified the following for purposes of 
settlement: 
 
       a class that consists of all persons who own or owned 
       at termination an individual permanent whole life 
       insurance policy issued by Prudential or any of its 
       United States Life insurance subsidiaries during the 
       Class Period of January 1, 1982 through December 31, 
       1995 (the "Policy" or "Policies"), except as specifically 
       described below [not relevant here] ("Policyholders"), 
       and do not timely exclude themselves from 
       participating in the settlement ("Class Members" or the 
       "Class"). 
 
App. at 727. The Certification Order also scheduled a date 
for a Settlement Hearing 
 
       to consider the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy 
       of the proposed settlement and terms and provisions of 
       the Stipulation, . . . and to determine whether the 
       proposed settlement and the Stipulation should be 
       finally approved by the Court. 
 
Id. at 729. In addition, the Certification Order required that 
Prudential provide Class Notices to all policyholders. The 
court required that the Class Notice 
 
       (i) contain a short, plain statement of the background 
       of the Actions, the conditional Class certification and 
       the proposed settlement, (ii) describe the proposed 
       forms of relief, (iii) explain the procedures for receiving 
       and participating in the proposed forms of relief, (iv) 
       explain Class Members' rights of exclusion, objection 
       and appeal and (v) state that any relief to Class 
       Members is contingent on the Court's final approval of 
       the proposed settlement. 
 
Id. at 730. 
 
The Class Notice also advised class members of the effect 
of the proposed settlement and referenced a Release that 
was attached as Appendix A. The Release stated in relevant 
part that "Class Members hereby expressly agree that they 
shall not . . . institute, maintain or assert . . . any and all 
causes of action, claims . . . that have been, [or] could have 
been, asserted by Plaintiffs or any Class Member against 
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[Prudential] in any other court action . . . connected with 
. . . The Released Transactions5.. ." Id. at 765. 
 
The Class Notice also told the Class Members how they 
could exclude themselves from the class and explained that 
policyholders who owned more than one policy could 
"choose to remain a Class Member with respect to some 
Policies, but . . . exclude [themselves] from the Class with 
respect to other Policies." Id. 
 
Following the mailing of the Class Notice and the 
Fairness Hearing, the district court entered a Final Order 
and Judgment certifying a settlement and approving the 
settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate. In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 962 
F. Supp. 450 (E. D. Pa. 1997). The Final Order also clearly 
informed all class members of the preclusive effect of the 
Settlement. It stated: 
 
       The terms of the Stipulation of Settlement and of this 
       Final Order and Judgment, including all exhibits and 
       supplemental exhibits thereto, shall forever be binding 
       on, and shall have res judicata and claim preclusive 
       effect in all pending and future lawsuits maintained by 
       or on behalf of, the plaintiffs and all other class 
       members, as well as their heirs, executors and 
       administrators, successors and assigns. All claims for 
       compensatory or punitive damages on behalf of class 
       members are hereby extinguished, except as provided 
       for in the Stipulation of Settlement. 
 
Id. In addition, the district court expressly incorporated the 
Release into the Final Order. Id. at 566. 
 
The Certification Order also contained the following 
injunction: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "Released Transactions" are defined in the Release to "mean the 
marketing, solicitation, application, underwriting, acceptance, sale, 
purchase, operation, retention, administration, servicing, or replacement 
by means of surrender, partial surrender, loans respecting, withdrawal 
and/or termination of the Policies or any insurance policy or annuity 
sold in connection with, or relating in any way directly or indirectly to 
the sale or solicitation of, the Policies. . . ." App. at 765. 
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       Prudential has offered evidence showing the existence 
       of multiple class actions which could act to seriously 
       impair this Court's ability to oversee the orderly and 
       efficient management of the proposed nationwide class 
       action settlement, and have demonstrated that without 
       preliminary injunctive relief, many similar actions 
       could proceed. Based on its familiarity with the issues 
       in this lawsuit and the complexity of the proposed 
       settlement, the Court finds that such actions may 
       substantially impair the ability of this Court and the 
       parties to implement the proposed settlement. . . 
       Therefore, based on the record, including the legal and 
       factual support for an injunction submitted by 
       Prudential, this Court finds that an injunction is 
       necessary to protect its jurisdiction, and hereby issues 
       the following injunction, effective upon the mailing of 
       the Class Notice, with Policyholders having been thus 
       afforded the opportunity to exclude themselves from 
       the Class: 
 
       All Policyholders and all persons acting on behalf 
       of or in concert or participation with any 
       Policyholder, are hereby enjoined from filing, 
       commencing, prosecuting, continuing, litigating, 
       intervening in or participating as class members 
       in, any lawsuit in any jurisdiction based on or 
       related to the facts and circumstances underlying 
       the claims and causes of action in this lawsuit, 
       unless and until such Policyholder has timely 
       excluded herself or himself from the Class.  
 
Id. at 735-36 (emphasis added). 
 
The district court invoked the authority of the All-Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a), and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 
U.S.C. S 2283, in entering this injunction. The court 
reasoned that the injunction was "necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction in order to effectuate the proposed settlement," 
id. at 735, and therefore permissible under the Anti- 
Injunction Act and authorized by the All-Writs Act. The 
court "retain[ed] exclusive jurisdiction as to all matters 
relating to administration, consummation, enforcement and 
interpretation of the Stipulation of Settlement and of [the] 
Final Order and Judgment, and for any other necessary 
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purpose," Id., before dismissing the action pursuant to the 
settlement agreement. 
 
We affirmed the district court's certification of the class 
and approval of the settlement in In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
of America Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of America, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999), and Krell v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of America, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). 
 
II. THE FLORIDA SUIT 
 
Marvin and Alice Lowe, the appellants here, are members 
of the class because they purchased five Prudential 
insurance policies between 1981 and 1989. Four of those 
policies were class eligible. The Lowes requested that two of 
the policies be excluded from the class (the "Excluded 
Policies"), but they remained class members as to two other 
policies (the "Class Policies"). 
 
Ten months after the district court certified the class and 
approved the nationwide settlement, the Lowes started an 
action in state court in Broward County Florida. There, 
they initially alleged that a Prudential agent had engaged in 
deceptive and fraudulent practices in connection with their 
purchase of all five insurance policies. However, because 
the Class Policies constituted Released Transactions under 
the terms of the class settlement, the Lowes filed an 
amended complaint in which they limited their claims to 
the two Excluded Policies. The Lowes' First Amended 
Complaint asserts a cause of action against Prudential for 
breach of fiduciary duty, violations of Florida's RICO 
statute, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
inducement, common law fraud, constructive fraud, 
reckless and wanton supervision, negligent supervision, 
and unjust enrichment. First Am. Compl. at PP 74-129. 
 
Prudential claimed that the First Amended Complaint 
continued to rely on, and enumerate, all of the 
circumstances surrounding the purchase of the two Class 
Policies. In fact, Prudential insisted that the Lowes merely 
deleted the policy numbers of the two Class Policies from 
their original complaint then refiled that same complaint as 
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the Amended Complaint. For example, the Class Action 
complaint alleged that: 
       Prudential engaged in a systematic fraudulent 
       marketing scheme in which its agents wrongfully 
       induced policyholders to purchase certain Prudential 
       life insurance policies. Second Am. Compl. at P 5. 
 
       Prudential implemented its scheme through the use of 
       false and misleading sales presentations, policy 
       illustrations, marketing materials, and other 
       information that Prudential approved, prepared, and 
       disseminated to its nationwide sales force. Second Am. 
       Compl. at P 5. 
 
       ******************* 
 
       Beginning in the early 1980's, Prudential used its 
       centralized marketing system to implement a scheme 
       to sell new insurance policies to existing and new 
       customers through three deceptive sales tactics: 
       "churning," "vanishing premium," and"investment 
       plan" techniques. 
 
962 F. Supp. at 473-74. The Lowes' First Amended 
Complaint alleged: 
 
       Sometime prior to 1982, the exact date being unknown 
       to the [Lowes], Prudential devised a sales scheme and 
       artifice to deprive its insureds and potential customers, 
       including the [Lowes], of their property, in which 
       Prudential trained its sales force, . . . , to induce and 
       persuade current and potential customers, including 
       the [Lowes], to purchase life insurance policies based 
       on false and misleading policy illustrations and sales 
       presentations, involving, inter alia, "churning" and 
       "vanishing premiums." 
 
       ************** 
 
       Prudential embarked upon a scheme, plan, and 
       common course of conduct through its agency system 
       within Florida to sell high commission whole life 
       polices to residents of the State of Florida through false 
       and misleading sales presentations and policy 
       illustrations based upon the vanishing premium 
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       concept. In this regard, Prudential targeted [the Lowes] 
       in a scheme that included inter alia: (1) the sale of . . . 
       vanishing premium policies, and (2) churning prior 
       existing "in force" polices. [The Lowes] were induced to 
       purchase various life insurance policies based on sales 
       presentations and policy illustrations and promises 
       that, if they made "out-of-pocket" premium payments 
       for a designated number of years, the interest earned 
       on the polices would be sufficient to pay the premiums 
       thereon for life, and thus, they would not have to come 
       out-of-pocket to pay premiums after the designated 
       number of years. 
 
Lowe's First Am. Compl. at PP 7, 39. 
 
The First Amended Complaint and the Class Complaint 
both alleged senior management involvement in the 
"scheme." Compare 962 F. Supp. at 473-478 and 148 F.3d 
at 294 (describing Class allegations, including allegations of 
senior management involvement) with Lowe's First 
Amended Complaint at P 26 ("[a]fter training and 
encouraging its agents to engage in the fraudulent scheme 
outlined above, Prudential turned a blind eye toward the 
fraudulent practices of its agents."). 
 
The Lowes, however, insisted that their First Amended 
Complaint deleted their claims for damages stemming from 
the purchase of the Released Transactions as well as any 
reference to the Released Transactions. They argued that 
the First Amended Complaint was not based on, and did 
not seek damages for, the claims underlying the two Class 
Policies. 
 
In a letter to Prudential's counsel dated January 13, 
1999, the Lowes' counsel explained "while we do not intend 
to seek damages based upon the non-opted out policies, the 
facts surrounding them were relevant to our claims , 
including but not limited to our claim of a pattern and 
practice by Prudential justifying not only the imposition of 
liability, but additionally an assessment of punitive 
damages." App. at 358 (emphasis added). Prudential 
concluded that this letter established that the Lowes 
intended to rely upon evidence relating to the Class Policies 
in their suit on the Excluded Policies. Thus, argued 
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Prudential, the Lowes intended to establish a pattern and 
practice of defrauding policyholders by relying upon facts 
relevant to the Class Policies and to use that evidence as a 
basis for their state claims for punitive and compensatory 
damages in relation to the sale of the Excluded Policies. 
Prudential argued that the Lowes' state court action would 
therefore force Prudential to defend the very matters 
covered by the Class Release.6 Accordingly, Prudential 
asked the district court to rule that the Lowes' action in 
Florida on the Excluded Policies violated the terms of the 
class settlement. 
 
The district court agreed and held that 
 
       permitting litigation of [Excluded Policies] claims 
       through the use of evidence of those sales practices 
       and patterns that were the subject of the class action 
       would impair the finality of the class settlement to an 
       unacceptable degree. In effect, this would permit the 
       relitigation of the released claims. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 4. Therefore, on March 29, 2000, the 
district court issued an order specifically enjoining the 
Lowes 
 
       from engaging in motion practice, pursuing discovery, 
       presenting evidence or undertaking any other action in 
       furtherance [of their state court action] that is based 
       on, relates to or involves facts and circumstances 
       underlying the Released Transactions in the Class  
       Action.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. On March 2, 2000, the Lowes filed a Third Amended Complaint in the 
state court expressly seeking, according to Prudential, punitive damages 
based on Class allegations. Prudential also says that by letter dated 
March 15, 2000, it informed the district court that"[i]n January 2000, 
the Lowes served Prudential with nearly 85 document requests, the 
majority of which . . . pertain to evidence based on, or related to, or 
involving the facts and circumstances underlying the Class claims." 
Prudential's Br. at 16. 
 
7. On April 6, 2000, Prudential notified the Florida state court judge and 
the Lowes that the district court had enforced the Class Injunction 
against the Lowes. After a status conference, the state court issued an 
order on April 17, 2000, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
                                11 
  
App. at 2. 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
We review the terms of an injunction for an abuse of 
discretion, underlying questions of law receive de novo 
review, and factual determinations are reviewed for clear 
error. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp. , 13 F.3d 
762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). The standard of review for the 
authority to issue an injunction under the Anti-Injunction 
Act and the All-Writs Act is de novo. Frank Russell Co. v. 
Wellington Mgmt. Co., Inc., 154 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
The Anti-Injunction Act provides: 
 
       A court of the United States may not grant an 
       injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except 
       as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
       necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
       effectuate its judgments. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2283. The Act "is an absolute prohibition 
against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the 
injunction falls within one of three specifically defined 
exceptions." Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
Consequently, "any injunction against state court 
proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       This action is stayed until clarification is achieved, either by 
       agreement of the parties or pursuant to further Court order, as to 
       the scope, effect and ramifications of the Letter Opinion and Order 
       [of the district court], so that the parties and this Court may 
       understand the practical impact this injunction will have on these 
       proceedings. 
 
App. at 988-89. Subsequently, on May 3, 2000, the state court sua 
sponte issued directions to the state court clerk that the Lowes' state 
court action was to be deemed inactive subject to reopening upon 
appropriate petition. 
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principles must be based on one of the specific statutory 
exceptions to S 2283 if it is to be upheld." Id. at 287. These 
"exceptions are narrow and are not to be enlarged by loose 
statutory construction." Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 
486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)(citations, internal quotations and 
brackets omitted). 
 
The injunction issued by the district court here was not 
"expressly authorized by Congress." Accordingly, it can be 
upheld only if it was necessary "in aid of [the district 
court's] jurisdiction" or "to protect or effectuate [that 
court's] judgments." 
 
The rule allowing injunctions that are necessary"to 
protect or effectuate [a court's] judgments" is also known as 
the "relitigation exception" to the Anti Injunction Act. Kam 
Choo, 486 U.S. at 147. "The relitigation exception was 
designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation 
of an issue that previously was presented to, and decided 
by, the federal court." Id. The exception"is founded in the 
well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel." Id. "[A]n essential prerequisite for applying the 
relitigation exception is that the claims or issues which the 
federal injunction insulates from litigation in state 
proceedings [must] actually have been decided by the 
federal court." Id. at 148. 
 
The Supreme Court has therefore urged that courts 
proceed with caution when considering issuing an 
injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act. "A federal court 
does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of 
S 2283 and to enjoin state court proceedings merely 
because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal 
right or invade an area preempted by federal law, even 
when the interference is unmistakably clear." Atlantic Coast 
Line R. R. Co., 398 U.S. at 294. "This rule applies 
regardless of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over 
the controversy, or whether it is ousted from jurisdiction for 
the same reason the state court is." Id. at 294-95. 
Moreover, even when the district court does have 
jurisdiction, "it is not enough that the requested injunction 
is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be`necessary in 
aid of ' that jurisdiction." Id. at 295 (emphasis added). 
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       While this language is admittedly broad, . . . it implies 
       something similar to the concept of injunctions to 
       `protect or effectuate' judgments. Both . . . imply that 
       some federal injunction relief may be necessary to 
       prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal 
       court's consideration or disposition of a case as to 
       seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and 
       authority to decide that case. 
 
Id. Moreover, "[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of a federal 
injunction against state court proceedings should be 
resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in 
an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy." Id. 
at 297. 
 
However, a caveat is in order here. Usually, "the`aid of 
jurisdiction' exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies 
only to parallel state in rem rather than in personam 
actions." Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202 
(7th Cir. 1997)(citing Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 
U.S. 623, 641-42 (1977)). The most notable exception to 
this general pattern of in rem application is "school 
desegregation cases, where conflicting orders from different 
courts would only serve to make ongoing federal oversight 
unmanageable." Winkler, 101 F.3d at 1202(citation 
omitted). Another exception that is more pertinent to our 
inquiry includes "consolidated multidistrict litigation, where 
a parallel state court action threatens to frustrate 
proceedings and disrupt the orderly resolution of the 
federal litigation." Id. (citing, among other cases, Carlough 
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
In Winkler, the Court concluded that the"necessary in aid 
of jurisdiction" exception "should be construed `to empower 
the federal court to enjoin a concurrent state proceeding 
that might render the exercise of the federal court's 
jurisdiction nugatory.' " Id. (citing Martin H. Redish, The 
Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 
754 (1977)). 
 
The All-Writs Act is similar in scope and operation to the 
Anti Injunction Act. In pertinent part, the All-Writs Act 
provides that: 
 
       The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of 
       Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
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       in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
       the usages and principles of law. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1651(a). The All-Writs Act "acts in concert" with 
the Anti-Injunction Act "to permit the issuance of an 
injunction[.]" 
 
       [W]hile the Anti-Injunction Act does not provide 
       positive authority for issuance of injunctions, it 
       describes those situations where injunctions are not 
       permitted. The All-Writs Act, by contrast, grants the 
       federal courts the authority to issue injunctions where 
       necessary in aid of their jurisdiction. The parallel 
       "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" language is construed 
       similarly in both the All-Writs Act and the Anti- 
       Injunction Act. 
 
Carlough, 10 F.3d at 201 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The Lowes argue that the district court's injunction here 
purports to rest on both the "necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction" exception and the "to protect or effectuate its 
judgments" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Lowes' Br. 
at 23. Prudential argues that the injunction was based 
solely on the relitigation exception of the Act. Prudential's 
Br. at 29. In its opinion, the district court stated that 
allowing the Lowes to use evidence of sales practices and 
patterns relating to the Class Policies in their state action 
on the Excluded Policies "would impair the finality of the 
class settlement to an unacceptable degree" and would 
effectively permit "the relitigation of the released claims." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 4. 
 
We are mindful, of course, that the injunction here is not 
directed at the Florida state court. Rather, it is directed at 
the Lowes as plaintiffs in that state court action. The Anti- 
Injunction Act is nevertheless directly implicated because 
"the prohibition of S 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing 
the order to the parties." Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 398 
U.S. at 287; see also The 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan for 
Eligible Employees of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 
405 (3d Cir. 1992)(The Anti-Injunction Act cannot be 
evaded by the formality of enjoining named parties rather 
than the state court proceeding itself). 
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The Lowes contend that the injunction was not 
authorized under the All-Writs Act and was barred by the 
Anti-Injunction Act. They argue in the alternative that the 
injunction should be vacated because it is overbroad, 
vague, ambiguous, beyond the scope of the Final Judgment 
and Order, and otherwise an abuse of discretion. 
 
It is now settled that a judgment pursuant to a class 
settlement can bar later claims based on the allegations 
underlying the claims in the settled class action. This is 
true even though the precluded claim was not presented, 
and could not have been presented, in the class action 
itself. See, TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 
F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982). TBK Partners appears to be 
the first case firmly establishing this principle. However, 
that rule has since been applied in other cases in the 
Second Circuit, see also In re Baldwin United Corp. (Single 
Premium Deferred Annuities Insurance Litigation), 770 F.2d 
328, 336 (2d Cir. 1985), and it has been accepted by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e. g., Class Plaintiffs v. 
City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992). In Class 
Plaintiffs, the court held that a federal court may release 
claims over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction if 
the state claims arise from the same nucleus of operative 
facts as the claims properly before it. 
 
Admittedly, it "may seem anomalous at first glance . . . 
that courts without jurisdiction to hear certain claims have 
the power to release those claims as part of a judgment." 
Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 
1563 (3d Cir. 1994). However, we have endorsed the rule 
because it "serves the important policy interest of judicial 
economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive 
settlements that `prevent relitigation of settled questions at 
the core of a class action.' " Id. (quoting TBK Partners, 675 
F.2d at 460). We cited this principle approvingly when we 
affirmed the district court's approval of the class action 
settlement here. See 148 F.3d at 326 n.82. 
 
That does not, however, end our inquiry. Although this 
principle is well established, we must examine the text of 
the Class Notice and, more particularly, the Class Release 
to determine the propriety of this injunction. We must 
determine whether settlement of claims the Lowes had 
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under the Class Policies precludes them from pursuing 
claims in Florida purportedly arising from the Excluded 
Policies. 
 
The Class Notice specifically referred to the Class Release 
and informed class members: 
 
        If the proposed settlement is approved by the Court, 
       and affirmed on appeal, the lawsuit will be dismissed 
       with prejudice, and Prudential will be released from all 
       claims that have been or could have been asserted by 
       Class Members. The release encompasses any matter 
       relating to the marketing, solicitation, application, 
       underwriting, acceptance, sale, purchase, operation, 
       retention, administration, servicing, or replacement, by 
       means of surrender, partial surrender, loans respecting 
       withdrawal and/or terminations of Policies or any 
       insurance policy or annuity sold in connection with or 
       relating in any way directly or indirectly to the sale or 
       solicitation of, the Policies. The release is intended to be 
       very broad. The release is a critical element of the 
       proposed settlement, and accordingly, the entire text 
       has been included in Appendix A to this Notice (except 
       for certain defined terms that appear elsewhere in this 
       Notice). Because it will affect your rights if you remain 
       in the Class, you should read this paragraph and the 
       entire release. 
 
Id. at 754 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, the Release 
was attached as Appendix A to the Class Notice, and 
provided, in relevant part: 
 
       Plaintiffs and all Class Members hereby expressly agree 
       that they shall not now or hereafter institute, maintain 
       or assert against any of the Releasees, either directly or 
       indirectly, on their own behalf, on behalf of the Class 
       or any other person, and release and discharge the 
       Releasees from, any and all causes of action, claims, 
       damages, equitable, legal and administrative relief, 
       interest, demands or rights, of any kind or nature 
       whatsoever, whether based on federal, state or local 
       statute or ordinance, regulation contract, common law, 
       or any other source, that have been, could have been, 
       may be or could be alleged or asserted now or in the 
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       future by Plaintiffs or any Class Member against the 
       Releasees in the Actions or in any other court action or 
       before any administrative body (including any state 
       Department of Insurance or other regulatory 
       commission), tribunal or arbitration panel on the basis 
       of, connected with, arising out of, or related to, in whole 
       or in part, the Released Transactions and servicing 
       relating to the Released Transactions. . . . 
 
Id. at 765 (emphasis added). 
 
The Class Policies constitute Released Transactions and 
the Lowes do not argue to the contrary. Accordingly, the 
Lowes clearly released Prudential from any claims"based 
on," "connected with," "arising out of," "or related to, in 
whole or in part" their two Class Policies. Inasmuch as the 
Class Release was expressly incorporated into the Final 
Order and Judgment, see 962 F. Supp. at 564, 566, it has 
both claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect, and class 
members were specifically advised of this. The Class 
Release also precludes class members from relying upon 
the common nucleus of operative facts underlying claims 
on the Class Policies to fashion a separate remedy against 
Prudential outside the confines of the Released Claims. 
Consequently, the Lowes, as class members on two Class 
Polices, are precluded from using the sales practices and 
factual predicates pertaining to their Class Policies in their 
state court action on the Excluded Policies. 
 
The district court concluded that allowing the Lowes to 
prosecute their civil claims in the Florida court would allow 
an end run around the Class settlement by affording them 
(and other class members who might later attempt the 
same strategy) an opportunity for "relitigation of the 
released claims." Dist. Ct. Op. at 4. Indeed, it would. In 
fact, the position urged by the Lowes here would seriously 
undermine the possibility for settling any large, multi 
district class action. Defendants in such suits would always 
be concerned that a settlement of the federal class action 
would leave them exposed to countless suits in state court 
despite settlement of the federal claims. Here, such state 
suits could number in the millions. 
 
The Lowes also suggest that the district court somehow 
lost the authority to enforce the Class Injunction against 
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them once the Class Settlement was approved and the Final 
Order and Judgment entered. However, in its Final Order 
and Judgment the district court expressly retained 
exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of the 
settlement and the judgment. 962 F. Supp. at 566,P10. 
The court acted quite properly in retaining jurisdiction in 
that fashion. A district court has the power to enforce an 
ongoing order against relitigation so as to protect the 
integrity of a complex class settlement over which it 
retained jurisdiction. See In re "Agent Orange" Product 
Liability Litigation, 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
Consequently, the district court's authority to enforce the 
Class Injunction did not end with entry of the Final Order 
and Judgment. 
 
The Lowes next contend that the All-Writs Act and 
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act do not give the district 
court the authority to enjoin them from engaging in 
discovery. However, the All-Writs Act and the Anti- 
Injunction Act do extend to discovery. See e. g. , Winkler, at 
1202 ( Both Acts give a district court the power to enjoin 
state discovery in order to protect the integrity of a federal 
court order); and Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein , 288 F.2d 
2345, 288 (2d Cir. 1961) (Both Acts give district court the 
authority to enjoin plaintiff from using "fruits of federal 
court discovery" in a state proceeding). 
 
The Lowes also argue that the Class Injunction precludes 
them, and all others who elected to opt-out of only some 
Class Eligible Policies "from pursuing any claims whatever 
on their" Excluded Policies. Lowes' Reply Br. at 16. 
Essentially, they argue that the district court's order 
"render[s] meaningless the opt-out provisions upon which 
[they] and all others who chose to exclude their Policies 
from the Class Settlement relied." Id. They contend that 
they should have at least been advised that anyone who 
opted-out on some of their class eligible policies but 
remained in the class on others, ran the risk that their 
right to pursue independent claims on the excluded policies 
was illusory and meaningless. 
 
This argument is not without force. However, the Lowes 
exaggerate the effect of the district court's order. That order 
only prevents them from using evidence common to the 
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purchase and sale of their Class Policies and their Excluded 
Policies in their state action on their Excluded Policies. It 
does not prohibit them from pursuing any and all claims on 
the Excluded Policies in the state court as they suggest. 
The district court made the distinction very clear in its 
carefully worded opinion. The court scrutinized the Lowes' 
Florida action, compared it with the Released Transactions 
and concluded: 
 
       Certain of their substantive causes of action appear 
       amenable to proof by evidence that is relevant 
       exclusively to the Excluded Policies. The Lowes claims 
       for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are examples. 
       Other counts . . . such as Lowes' claim that Prudential 
       violated the Florida state RICO statute, or practiced 
       reckless and wanton supervision, are different. To 
       prosecute these claims the Lowes would presumably 
       seek to discover and submit broader evidence of 
       wrongful activity. Indeed, the language of their 
       complaint leaves no room for doubt as to the Lowes' 
       intention in that regard. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 3-4. 
 
It is difficult to imagine how the Lowes' could prosecute 
their claims under Florida's RICO statute, or pursue their 
allegations of reckless and wanton supervision, without 
relying upon evidence that is relevant to the Class Policies 
as well as the Excluded Policies. Nevertheless, the district 
court's injunction does not prevent them from attempting to 
prove those claims if they can do it in a manner that is 
consistent with the Class Release and their status as class 
members. Id. at 4-5. "The Lowes are free to attempt proving 
their RICO and other claims without the use of such 
evidence. . . . [T]o the extent those claims cannot survive 
without the evidence excluded by the [district court], such 
a result could only bolster the conclusion that the failing 
claims were part of the class settlement." Id . at 4-5. We 
agree that if the Lowes can not meet their burden on the 
Excluded Policies absent this evidence, that will be proof of 
the injunctive pudding. Thus, we do not believe that the 
Class Notice was deficient or that class members were 
blindsided by this injunction. We have previously affirmed 
the adequacy of that Notice against other attacks, see In re 
 
                                20 
  
Prudential Ins. Of America Sales Practices Litigation, 148 
F.3d 283, and we again affirm the adequacy of that Notice 
against the specific issues raised by the Lowes. 8 
 
When the Lowes reviewed the Release and the Class 
Notice, they surely must have realized that, even though 
they could exclude certain policies from the settlement 
while including others, doing so would jeopardize their 
ability to prove claims relating to the Excluded Policies. The 
district court was not willing to release them from their 
bargain; neither are we. 
 
In a related argument, the Lowes insist that even if the 
district court had the authority to enforce the Class 
Injunction against them, the district court's order is "vague, 
ambiguous, overly expansive and beyond the scope of the 
Final Order and Judgment," and should therefore be 
reversed, or, at a minimum, remanded to the district court 
for clarification. Lowes' Br. at 28, 37. We do not agree. We 
doubt that either the Lowes or a state court would have 
difficulty determining which "facts and circumstances" are 
common to the Excluded and Class Policies. In fact, as 
Prudential is quick to point out, the district court has 
already sorted much of this out. "The `facts and 
circumstances' underlying the Class Settlement are clearly 
laid out in the district court's 120 page opinion approving 
the Settlement and Certifying the Settlement Class." 
Prudential's Br. at 43. 
 
The Lowes attempt to demonstrate that the district 
court's order is vague and ambiguous by posing a 
hypothetical (and somewhat facetious) question. They ask 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We do, however, take this opportunity to add a note of caution. The 
Class Notice adequately informed potential class members of the right to 
opt-out of the class as to some policies and remain in the class as to 
other policies. It also gave adequate notice of the rights that would be 
surrendered as to any policies not excluded from the class. In the future, 
however, it may be advisable for district courts to consider adding more 
specific language to settlement documents. Any such language would 
advise class members that, even though they retain certain claims as to 
transactions excluded from a settlement, their ability to pursue those 
claims may be hindered by the terms of the release of claims that remain 
part of any class settlement. 
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whether they will be able at trial to mention any meetings 
with Prudential's agents, or mention the payment of 
premiums, or communications between them and 
Prudential, "even if these events took place with regard to 
the excluded policies, but also involved the type of wrongful 
conduct that took place during the time frame addressed by 
the Class Action?" Lowes' Br. at 35-36. Prudential responds 
correctly and succinctly: "Quite simply, that[evidence] . . . 
is permissible so long as it relates directly to the opted-out 
policies, and does not call for broader evidence of an alleged 
scheme, or call into question evidence as to the Lowes' 
Class Policies." Prudential's Br. at 43. We agree. 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that the district court was well within its 
authority in enforcing the Class Injunction in the manner 
that it did, and that it did not abuse its discretion. The 
court had carefully managed this vast and intricate 
settlement in a manner that allowed for its fair and 
reasonable resolution while protecting the interests of all of 
the parties involved. As part of the settlement agreement 
class members such as the Lowes agreed to release certain 
claims against Prudential. The agreement could not have 
been enforced without the injunction that the Lowes now 
challenge. The district court's order did nothing more than 
enforce that agreement. Accordingly, for all the reasons set 
forth above, we will affirm order of the district court. 
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